Sylvain BéalFull Professor in Economics

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Responsability and research domain

Head of CRESE, Game Theory


Coalitional desirability and the equal division value (2018), Theory and Decision 86:95–106
Author(s) : Solal Philippe, Rémila Eric

Working papers

Efficient extensions of the Myerson value, Sylvain Béal, André Casajus and Frank Huettner

Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure, Sylvain Béal, Anna Khmelnitskaya and Philippe Solal

A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Efficient extensions of communication values, Sylvain Béal, André Casajus and Frank Huettner (2015)

Relationship between labeled network games and museum pass games, Encarnación Algaba, Sylvain Béal, Vito Fragnelli, Natividad Llorca and Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano (2019)

Examination design: an axiomatic approach, Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrière

Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value, Sylvain Béal & Issofa Moyouwou & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal