Is Amnesty Plus more Successful in Fighting Multimarket Cartels? An Exploratory Analysis, Review of Industrial Organization (2022), This experiment shows how different levels of fines in three antitrust policies (no leniency (NL), standard leniency (LP), and amnesty plus (AP)) can deter multimarket cartels. With a low fine, AP signifi- cantly increases multimarket cartels and leads to higher prices. With a high fine, it has the same effect on collusion as other policies. Regarding one-market cartels, it decreases cartel stability relative to LP. With a high fine, it leads to more reporting than LP, before any investigation and after a first cartel conviction. Higher fines also lead to higher prices in NL and LP, but not higher than in AP.
Author(s) : Brisset Karine, Cochard François, Lambert Ève-Angéline
Envol du marché du luxe de seconde main : le rôle des enchères en ligne. Revue Française d’Economie 2021/2 (Vol. XXXVI) (2021), https://doi.org/10.3917/rfe.212.0197
Author(s) : Brisset Karine, Cochard François, Kane El Hadj
Leniency programs, medium essay, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Springer, février (2021), .
Author(s) : Brisset Karine
The Impact of a Right of First Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders, Journal of Institutional and theoretical economics (2020), .
Author(s) : Brisset Karine, Cochard François, Maréchal François
Fighting multi-market cartels, an experimental comparison of the American and European leniency programs, Revue Economique (2019), .
Author(s) : Brisset Karine, Cochard François, Lambert Eve-Angéline