Author(s) : , Courtault J.M., Rimbaux Eric, Zhu T.
Revue française d'économie, Vol. 25-3, 2011, pp. 185-230.
Author(s) : Courtault J.M., Hayek N., Rimbaux Eric, Zhu T.
Journal of socio-economics, Vol.39-2, avril 2010, pp. 329-337
Author(s) : Ayouba Kassoum, Duboz Marie-Line, Le Gallo Julie
Applied Economics
Author(s) : Brisset Karine, Cochard François, Lambert Ève-Angéline
This experiment shows how different levels of fines in three antitrust policies (no leniency (NL), standard leniency (LP), and amnesty plus (AP)) can deter multimarket cartels. With a low fine, AP signifi- cantly increases multimarket cartels and leads to higher prices. With a high fine, it has the same effect on collusion as other policies. Regarding one-market cartels, it decreases cartel stability relative to LP. With a high fine, it leads to more reporting than LP, before any investigation and after a first cartel conviction. Higher fines also lead to higher prices in NL and LP, but not higher than in AP.
Author(s) : Deschamps Marc, Ravix Joël-Thomas, Sautel Olivier
Revue d’Économie Politique
Author(s) : Béal Sylvain, Deschamps Marc, Ravix Joël-Thomas, Sautel Olivier
Revue de l’OFCE
Author(s) : Béal Sylvain, Deschamps Marc, Ravix Joël-Thomas, Sautel Olivier
Economie et Prévision