Production scientifiqueDocuments de travail

Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal (2015)

Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal (2015)

Efficient extensions of communication values

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus and Frank Huettner (2015)

A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure

Sylvain Béal, Anna Khmelnitskaya and Philippe Solal

Efficient extensions of the Myerson value

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus and Frank Huettner