Sylvain BéalProfesseur des Universités

E-mail :sylvain.beal@univ-fcomte.fr
Tél. :(+33) (0)3 81 66 68 91
Page :https://sites.google.com/site/bealpage/home
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Responsabilité et domaine de recherche

Directeur du CRESE, thème de recherche : théorie des jeux

Publications

Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value (2020), Mathematical Social Sciences 104:15–22.
Auteur(s) : Béal Sylvain, Issofa Moyouwou, Rémila Eric, Solal Philippe

Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies (A paraître), Operations Research Letters
Auteur(s) : Béal Sylvain, Navarro Florian

Documents de travail

Efficient extensions of the Myerson value, Sylvain Béal, André Casajus and Frank Huettner

Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure, Sylvain Béal, Anna Khmelnitskaya and Philippe Solal

A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Efficient extensions of communication values, Sylvain Béal, André Casajus and Frank Huettner (2015)

Relationship between labeled network games and museum pass games, Encarnación Algaba, Sylvain Béal, Vito Fragnelli, Natividad Llorca and Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano (2019)

Examination design: an axiomatic approach, Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrière

Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value, Sylvain Béal & Issofa Moyouwou & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal

The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure, Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières and Philippe Solal

Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies, Sylvain Béal and Florian Navarro