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RÉMILA Éric

Professeur des Universités

Publications

BÉAL Sylvain, CASAJUS André, HUETTNER Frank, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

Solidarity within a Fixed Community

BÉAL Sylvain, GHINTRAN Amandine, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations

BÉAL Sylvain, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel

BÉAL Sylvain, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value

BÉAL Sylvain, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization

BÉAL Sylvain, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

BÉAL Sylvain, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

An optimal bound to acces the core of TU-games

BÉAL Sylvain, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core

BÉAL Sylvain, GHINTRAN Amandine, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

The River Sharing Problem : a Survey

BÉAL Sylvain, GHINTRAN Amandine, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Sharing International Rivers with Bifurcations

BÉAL Sylvain, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors: The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions

BÉAL Sylvain, RÉMILA Éric, SOLAL Philippe

Axioms of Invariance for TU-games