Sylvain BEAL

Responsabilité et domaine de recherche

Théorie de jeux coopératifs, jeux répétés, formation stratégique de réseaux


Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games, avec Eric Rémila et Philippe Solal, Theory and Decision, 2017, 83, pp. 61–94.

Discounted Tree Solution, with E. Rémila and Solal P., Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2017, 219, pp 1-17. 

A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for rooted trees, avec Eric Rémila et Philippe Solal, Annals of Operations Research, 2017, 253, pp. 43–59.

On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs (with Casajus A., and Huettner F.), Economics Letters, 2016, volume 146, pages 103-106.

Comparable axiomatizations of two allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable utility and their subclass of data games (with Deschamps M. and Solal P.), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2016, n°18, pages 992-1004.

Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification, with Sylvain Ferrières, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal, 2016, Mathematical Social Sciences, 80:47–57.,

Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form, with E. Rémila and P. Solal, 2016, International Game Theory Review, 18:1650003.

Characterizations of weighted and equal division values, with Casajus A., Huettner F., Rémila R. and Solal P., 2016, Theory and Decision, 80:649-667.

Efficient extensions of the Myerson value, with Casajus A. and Huettner F., 2015, Social Choice & Welfare, 45:819–827.

On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation, (with Deschamps M.), 2016, European Journal of Law and Economics, 41:157-181.

Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel, with Rémila E.and Solal P., Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, 60, pp. 59-165.

A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance, with Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal, Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2015, 184, pp. 1-13.

Axioms of Invariance for TU-games, with Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal, International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44, pp. 891-902.

Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value, with Rémila E. and Solal P., Operations Research Letters, 2015, 43, 123–125.

Freezeout, Compensation Rules, and Voting Equilibria, (with At C. and Morand P.H.) International Review of Law and Economics, 2015, 41, pp. 91-102.

Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?, with Rémila E. and Solal P., Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 73:23–31.

The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations, (with Ghintran A., Rémila E. and Solal P.) Theory and Decision, 2015, 279, pp. 251-283.

Solidarity within a fixed community, with A. Casajus, F. Huettner, Rémila E. and Solal P., Economics Letters, 2014, 125:440–443.

Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core, (with Rémila E. and Solal P.) Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2013, 78, pp. 187-202.

An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games, (with Rémila E. and Solal P.) Games and Economic Behavior, 80:1–9.

The River Sharing Problem: A Survey, 2013, with Amandine Ghintran, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal, International Game Theory Review, 15, pp 1340016.

Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors: The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions, (with E. Rémila and P. Solal) 2012, Economics Letters117:263-267.

The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games, (with Aymeric Lardon, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal), 2012, Annals of Operations Research, 196:27-51.

Weighted Component Fairness for Forest Games, (with E. Rémila and P. Solal) 2012, Mathematical Social Sciences, 64, pp. 144-151.

On the Number of Blocks Required to Access the Core', (with Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal) 2012, Discrete Applied Mathematics, 160:925–932.

Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games, 2012, avec Eric Rémila et Philippe Solal, International Journal of Game Theory, 41:157-178.

Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends, avec Richard Baron, Eric Rémila et Philippe Solal, International Journal of Game Theory, 2011, 40, pp.331-349.

Les effets d’une réglementation sur la concurrence et l’innovation : première analyse de la réglementation européenne REACH, with Marc Deschamps, Joël-Thomas Ravix and Olivier Sautel, 2011, Economie et Prévision, 197-198:63–80.

La mise en place de la législation européenne REACH : Une analyse des effets anticoncurrentiels, avec Marc Deschamps, Joël-Thomas Ravix et Olivier Sautel, 2011, Revue de l'OFCE, 118, pp.113-128.

Les informations exigées par la législation REACH : Analyse du partage des coûts, with Marc Deschamps, Joël-Thomas Ravix and Olivier Sautel, 2010, Revue d'Economie Politique, vol. 120, pp. 109-132.

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization, 2010, avec Subhadip Chakrabarti, Amandine Ghintran et Philippe Solal, Games, 1:338–356.

Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturels, avec Philippe Solal, Revue Economique, 2010, vol. 61, pp. 1099-1109.

Perceptron versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 2010, Theory and Decision, 69:183-204.

Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree Games, avec Eric Rémila et Philippe Solal, 2010, European Journal of Operational Research, 203:404-408.

Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games, avec Jacques Durieu et Philippe Solal, 2008, Mathematical Social Sciences, 56:303-313.

Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation, avec Nicolas Quérou, 2007, Mathematical Social Sciences, 54:71-89.

Comportements adaptatifs sans croyances, avec Jacques Durieu, 2006, Revue d’Economie Industrielle, 114-115:119-140.

Rationalité limitée et jeux de machines, 2005, Revue Economique, 56:1033-1063.


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